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The diversification benefits associated with banks off-balance-sheet activities (OBS), and particularly non- 
traditional activities, is a question much debated in the literature. These activities, related to the emergence 
of shadow banking, greatly contribute to the volatility of bank operating revenues, but their impact on  
accounting returns is less clear (Stiroh and Rumble 2006). In this paper, we use a Canadian dataset to 
revisit the risk-return trade-off associated with banks OBS activities and study the evolution of the endoge-
neity of banks decision to expand their market-oriented business lines. Consistent with the changing mix of 
noninterest income OBS activities generate, we identify a structural break in 1997 which coincides with an 
increased impact of endogeneity on banks returns, and which also leads to an increased return on assets 
(ROA) and a surge in banking risk. We trace the sources of the greater volatility of noninterest income to a 
tighter co-integrating relationship between noninterest income and stock market indices after 1997. Intro-
ducing a new, robust estimation method based on a modification of the Hausman procedure, we find that 
neglecting endogeneity greatly underestimates the positive impact of shadow banking on bank accounting 
returns, even when the subprime crisis is considered. Our main results suggest that the influence of market-
based activities on the risk-return trade-off might be larger than what was previously thought. 
 
 
JEL classification: C32; G20; G21. 
Keywords: Noninterest income; Hausman test; Structural break; Shadow Banking; Endogeneity: Macro-
prudential analysis. 
 
L’essor des activités bancaires non traditionnelles et les bénéfices cachés 




L’ampleur des gains de diversification associés aux activités bancaires hors-bilan (OBS), et particulière-
ment aux activités non traditionnelles, est une question fort débattue dans la littérature. Ces activités, qui 
sont issues de l’émergence du système bancaire parallèle (shadow banking), contribuent fortement à la 
volatilité des revenus d’opération des banques, mais leur impact sur les rendements comptables est moins 
clairement établi (Stiroh and Rumble 2006). Dans cet article, nous réexaminons l’arbitrage rendement-
risque relié aux activités OBS de manière à étudier l’évolution de l’endogénéité de la décision des banques 
de développer leurs opérations orientées vers les marchés financiers. En conformité avec le changement 
dans la composition des revenus autres que d’intérêt que les activités OBS occasionnent, nous identifions 
un changement structurel en 1997 qui coïncide avec l’impact accru de l’endogénéité sur les rendements 
bancaires, et qui se traduit également par une augmentation du rendement sur les actifs (ROA) et un gon-
flement de la volatilité des revenus. Nous associons ce sursaut de volatilité au chapitre des revenus autres 
que d’intérêt à une relation de cointégration plus étroite entre les revenus autres que d’intérêt et les indices 
boursiers après 1997. En nous basant sur une nouvelle version robuste de la régression artificielle 
d’Hausman, nous trouvons que la méthode des moindres carrés ordinaires, qui fait abstraction de 
l’endogénéité, donne lieu à une sous-estimation importante de l’impact positif du shadow banking sur les 
rendements bancaires, et ce même après la prise en compte de la crise 2007-2009. Nos principaux résultats 
suggèrent que l’influence, sur les rendements, des activités bancaires centrées sur les marchés financiers 
pourrait être beaucoup plus importante qu’on ne le pensait jusqu’ici.   
 
Classification JEL: C32; G20; G21. 
Mots-clefs: Revenu autre que d’intérêt; test d’Hausman ; Changement structurel; Shadow banking; Endo-
généité ; Analyse macroprudentielle.    3
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  Banks off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities, and in particular securitization, have 
fuelled the last lending boom, enabling banks to increase their operational funding. This 
eventually led to a standard liquidity crisis driven by maturity mismatch (Farhi and Tirole 
2009, Gorton and Metrick 2009). At the core of the problem is the recent change in the 
banking landscape, which now, thanks to deregulation, comprises the whole leveraged 
financial system, including market based banking
1. This new type of banking, which 
Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010) call shadow banking, presents a considerable challenge to 
central banks and regulators. In the context of this new banking era, it becomes crucial 
for central banks to fully understand the behaviour of OBS activities. What we know so 
far is that the increase in banks non-traditional activities has had a significant influence 
on banks risk-return trade-off (DeYoung and Roland 2001, Estrella 2001, Acharya 2002, 
Clark and Siems 2002, Stiroh 2004, Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Baele et al. 2007, De 
Jonghe 2009, Nijskens and Wagner 2011). International evidence suggests that it trig-
gered a substantial increase in the volatility of banks net operating revenue growth, with-
out a clear increase in returns (Stiroh 2004, Baele et al. 2007, De Jonghe 2009, Calmès 
and Liu 2009, Nijskens and Wagner 2011). The Canadian experience also suggests that 
the contribution to banks income of the revenues generated from market-oriented activi-
ties, i.e. noninterest income, rapidly became a key, procyclical determinant of banks 
profits after 1997 (Calmès and Théoret 2010). However, to our knowledge, the literature 
does not provide any rigorous evidence about the evolution of the endogeneity of the 
share of noninterest income (snonin) during the transition period the banking business 
                                                      
1 See Shin (2009) for a detailed explanation.    4
underwent. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap and check whether the change that 
occurred in the banking system, namely the rise of shadow banking, is associated with a 
change in the degree of OBS endogeneity. Indeed, if banks non-traditional activities are 
better integrated to the banking business, we should expect more regularity in the rela-
tionship between snonin and ROA . To study this question, we introduce a new approach 
based on a modified version of the Hausman test specifically designed to gauge the 
changes in the endogeneity of banks decision to expand their market-based activities. 
Another motivation for adopting this alternative approach comes from the fact 
that treating endogeneity too casually can leave spurious correlations between snonin and 
unobservables not accounted for in banks returns equations (Stiroh 2004). In particular, 
the remaining non-orthogonality of snonin with the innovation in the returns equations 
can cause serious biases in the parameters estimates and yield misleading results. To treat 
endogeneity, Stiroh and Rumble (2006), and Baele et al. (2007) introduce fixed effects or 
lagged explanatory variables in their panel regressions. Some authors also introduce 
various control variables and other techniques to deal with this issue (Fluck and Lynch 
1999, Chevalier 2000, Lamont and Polk 2001, Maksimovic and Phillips 2002, Graham et 
al. 2002, Villalonga 2004, Laeven and Levine 2007). However, this kind of approach 
does not completely alleviate the problem. In particular, it is generally not suited to 
investigate the changes in the relative contribution of noninterest income to banks profits. 
To our knowledge, the study of Goddard et al. (2008) is the only one using conventional 
instrumental variables to treat the endogeneity of snonin. We depart from their method 
however, introducing a new technique, an h test based on an artificial regression equiva-
lent to a two-stage least squares (TSLS) procedure, but modified to gauge endogeneity   5
biases. The key advantage of this procedure is that it provides a direct measure of the 
changing biases in the endogenous variable coefficient associated with noninterest in-
come, while also delivering robust instruments built with the higher moments of the 
explanatory variables (Fuller 1987, Lewbel 1997, Racicot and Théoret 2008, Meng et al. 
2011). 
We apply this framework to a Canadian dataset to study the emergence of shadow 
banking and assess its positive impact on the aggregate banking risk-return trade-off over 
the whole sample, which runs from the first fiscal quarter of 1988 to the second fiscal 
quarter of 2010
2. Consistent with the findings of European studies (Baele et al. 2007,  
Lepetit et al. 2008, Busch and Kick 2009) we detect an improvement of the risk-return 
trade-off, OBS activities leading to greater returns on assets and equity after 1997. More 
importantly, we find that this change is associated with a structural break which coincides 
with a sharp increase in the volatility of banks net operating revenues growth and in the 
ratio of noninterest income. As evidenced by financial flows accounts, the magnitude of 
banks financial flows jumps after 1997, providing evidence that banks were entering into 
a new risk regime.  
The year 1997 is a plausible break since it is around this date that banks modified 
the mix of their OBS activities in Canada, giving a much greater weight to their market-
based operations, like trading and capital markets operations, which boosted the volatility 
of their operating income. Accompanying this volatility spike, our main results suggest 
that endogeneity, which was a minor concern before 1997, increases substantially there-
after, a fact generally overlooked in the literature. What we find is that the link between 
                                                      
2 Note that the involvement of Canadian banks in OBS activities was quite restricted before 1987, banks being not allowed to get 
involved in investment banking until this date. For example, before 1987, Canadian banks reported very low commissions.    6
ROA and snonin becomes stronger and much more significant after the structural break, 
and that this result is greatly reinforced when properly accounting for endogeneity. Com-
pared to TSLS, ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimations substantially understate the 
sensitivity of ROA to snonin during the second subperiod, 1997-2010. Overall, the new 
evidence we gather suggests a marked increase in the endogeneity of noninterest income, 
which strongly supports the idea that the bank regime shift might be deeper than previ-
ously thought.   
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the data and some 
basic stylized facts about the behaviour of noninterest income. Then, in section 3, we 
expose the banks returns model and the modified Hausman method we introduce to 
monitor the change in the endogeneity of noninterest income. The fourth section details 
our results and various robustness checks, and the last section concludes with some 
straightforward policy implications. 
 
2. The change in noninterest income  
2.1. The data  
The sample we use runs from the first fiscal quarter of 1988 to the second fiscal quar-
ter of 2010. In total, we consider eight banks, and quarterly data for about twenty two 
years, so that, aggregating, we have around ninety observations, a number of observations 
reasonable to perform standard time series regressions. 
In the study, we use aggregate data of the whole Canadian banking system. Data 
come from the Canadian Bankers Association, the Office of the Superintendent of Finan-
cial Institutions, the Bank of Canada and CANSIM. The sample comprises the eight   7
major Canadian domestic banks, which, taken together, account for 90 percent of the 
Canadian banking business. All of them are chartered banks, i.e. commercial banks 
regulated by the Canadian Bank Act, running a broad range of activities, from loan busi-
ness to brokerage, investment dealing, fiduciary services, insurance and securitization.  
Given the high degree of concentration of the Canadian banking sector, the banks are 
generally well funded, with extremely low probability of bankruptcy. Considering the 
small number of banks in the sample, we obviously need to focus our analysis on aggre-
gate data in order to get robust regression results. Indeed, with panel data regressions, we 
would need more observations to ensure reliable findings. 
Note that a specificity of the Canadian shadow banking is that it is much concentrated 
in, and controlled by, the traditional banking sector, and, therefore, not divided between 
commercial banks and security dealers (e.g., investment banks).  In other words, this 
homogenous dataset offers the key advantage of being easy to work with. Compared to 
the US or the European banking sectors, the Canadian banking sector might appear quite 
small to draw any meaningful inference about the emergence of a new banking environ-
ment (i.e. shadow banking). However, our methodological choice, based on aggregate 
time series, comprising 90 observations, and very parsimonious models, is more than 
enough to derive robust results.  
 
2.2. The evolution of the noninterest income series 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
    Figure 1 presents the evolution of the performance of the Canadian banking 
system during the whole sample period. First note that banks returns, as measured by the   8
return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE), share a very close relationship
3. 
The Hodrick-Prescott trends indicate that these two returns measures tend to move up-
ward since the beginning of the 1990s. This movement can be explained by the down-
ward trend in the loan loss provisions ratio, but it might also relate to the better integra-
tion of banks traditional and OBS activities. Relatedly, Figure 2 illustrates the growth in 
the banks noninterest income share (in net operating revenues). By 2000, noninterest 
income accounted for 57% of net operating revenue, up from only 25% in 1988. This 
ratio seems to have stabilized thereafter, as the new banking business lines matured. The 
ratio somewhat increased after the high tech bubble burst, culminating at 60% in the first 
quarter of 2006, but decreased again thereafter, particularly during the recent credit crisis.  
 More importantly note that the fluctuations of snonin are much larger after 1997.  
In particular, snonin becomes increasingly sensitive to the fluctuations of the financial 
markets after 1997 (Calmès and Liu 2009). Data actually suggest the presence of a struc-
tural break around this date
4. The post 1997 increased volatility of snonin series is also 
apparent if banks are considered individually
5. As an illustration, Figure 3 provides a 
comparison of snonin for three Canadian banks differing by size: a relatively small-sized 
bank, the National Bank of Canada (NBC); a medium-sized bank, the Toronto-Dominion 
Bank (TD), and the largest Canadian bank, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)
6. Contrary 
to the RBC noninterest income share, the NBC and especially the TD shares have be-
come very volatile since 1997. The snonin of NBC has remained on a volatile upward 
trend, before collapsing on the fourth quarter of 2007, while the TD share has decreased 
                                                      
3 Due to the high correlation of ROE and ROA we only study the behaviour of ROA in this paper.  
4 We run a Chow test confirming this structural break. See also Calmès and Théoret (2009). Additional tests follow. 
5 Note however that there is some evidence of the benefit of relying on banks aggregate data for macroprudential analysis. For 
example, return on equity is among the best indicators of the raise in systemic banking instability (Cihàk and Schaeck 2007).  
6 For the second quarter of 2010, total assets of NBC, TD and RBC amounted to 134 billion $, 567 billion $, and 659 billion $ 
respectively. Their relative shares in the assets of the pool of the eight domestic banks were 5.0%, 21.5%, and 25.0%. For the fourth 
quarter of 1996, these respective shares were: 5.5%, 13.5% and 23.9%.    9
substantially since 2000. The dispersion in banks snonin has also greatly increased since 
1997, maybe suggesting a less herd like behavior, and perhaps a sign of improvement in 
the diversification of the banking industry.  
 Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Insert Table 1 about here 
  Since the volatility of snonin contributes to the volatility of operating income, we 
should consequently expect an increase in Canadian banks net operating income volatility 
after 1997. Of course, the financial turmoil in the Asian markets and the high-tech bubble 
can be partly accountable for such fluctuations. But the increasing share of noninterest 
income is surely another important factor to understand the change in banks net operating 
income. In this respect, the adoption, in 1997, of the VaR as the standard banks risk 
measure has likely contributed to the increased income growth volatility because of the 
tendency of this risk measure to underestimate the negative impact of fat tails. Table 1 
provides the decomposition of the variance of net operating income growth over the 
whole sample period and over the two subperiods 1988-1996 and 1997-2010. On the first 
subperiod net interest income contributes the most to the variance of net operating in-
come. However after 1997, the rise in the variance of bank net operating income is due, 
for the most part, to the increased volatility of noninterest income. For instance, from the 
subperiod 1988-1996 to the subperiod 1997-2010, the variance of net operating income 
growth increased from 11 to 66.3, and the absolute contribution of noninterest income 
increased from 3.0 to 63.4. Relatedly, Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of the variance 
moving average of net operating income growth and its two components, net interest 
income and noninterest income, over the period 1983 to 2010. While the volatility of net   10
operating income growth is relatively stable before 1997, it is no longer the case after, as 
the fluctuations of the variance of the net operating income growth sharply increase.  
To further describe where the change is coming from, Table 2 provides the de-
scriptive statistics of the components of Canadian banks noninterest income over the 
period 1997-2010
7. Observe that the components which have the highest standard devia-
tions are those related to market-oriented activities, mainly the capital markets and the 
trading revenues. The average share of these two components is almost 50% over the 
period 1997-2010. Figure 5 confirms that these two components indeed drive the fluctua-
tions of the variance moving average of noninterest income growth over the period 1997-
2010. Relatedly, Table 3 also provides the decomposition of the variance of noninterest 
income growth over this period. On a total variance of 3016.3, the absolute contribution 
of the trading income component is as high as 2929.9, which represents a relative contri-
bution of 97% to the total variance, although the relative share of trading income to 
noninterest income only amounts to 11%. The remaining variance is mainly explained by 
the capital market income component. In other words, the fluctuations of the noninterest 
income growth are, to a large extent, explained by the two components related to banks 
market-oriented activities. Note that the high relative contribution of these two inter-
related components to the covariance of noninterest income suggests that the additional 
diversification benefits that these components could bring might be low. In terms of 
diversification benefits, ceteris paribus, it is securitization and insurance revenues which 
actually seem to offer the better perspective, with relative contributions to covariance 
equal respectively to -24.7 and -6.8, and a total contribution to variance equal to -23.4 
and -1.7.  
                                                      
7 Statistics are not available before this date.    11
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
To conclude on this change in the banking activities mix, note that after 1997 the vol-
atility of snonin increases in conjunction with the Canadian stock market index, i.e., 
S&P/TSX (Figure 6), and with the fluctuations of banks stock trading portfolio (Figure 
7). A closer look at Figure 6 actually suggests that there might be a cointegration rela-
tionship between TSX and snonin over the sample period. We run an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test which seems to suggest that both snonin and TSX are two I(1) variables (Table 
6), so that they can potentially be cointegrated. Table 4 reports the results of a Johansen’s 
cointegration test between these two variables. When the variables are both expressed in 
levels, the test indicates a conintegration relationship between the two variables over the 
period 1988-2010 at the 10% threshold. More importantly the test identifies a tighter 
cointegration relationship after 1997, while the test fails to reject the hypothesis of no 
conintegration relationship over the first subperiod (1988-1996). We also perform the test 
by taking the logarithm of TSX and obtain the same kind of result. The growing impor-
tance of capital markets and trading income might thus well be related to this tighter 
cointegration of snonin and TSX, which might have contributed to the growth in operat-
ing income volatility at that time. Moreover, this tighter cointegration can also partly 
explained the increased procyclicality observed in the banking sector over the last decade 
(Calmès and Théoret 2010, Nijskens and Wagner 2011).  
Insert Figure 6 and 7 about here 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here   12
Naturally, the greater volatility of banks operating income observed after 1997 should 
be associated with a higher expected ROA, as finance theory would predict. However, in 
practice, the evidence is rather mixed. For example, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and 
Calmès and Liu (2009) do not find clear diversification benefits associated with OBS 
activities, whereas Nijskens and Wagner (2011) finds a positive diversification effect, but 
associated with an increased systemic risk. Table 5 suggests that the Spearman rank-order 
correlation between ROA and snonin seems to be moderately negative for the aggregate 
of the eight major Canadian banks and our three banks between 1988 and 1996. On the 
other hand, we find that it becomes strongly positive after 1997 (cf. Figure 8). Relatedly, 
as banks increase their involvement in OBS activities, their loan loss provisions (LLP) 
decrease, both in level and volatility (Figure 9). This trend might be explained by a new 
type of banking strategy aiming at transferring bank risk off-balance-sheet (Brunnermeier 
2009). Nevertheless, since the ROE and ROA volatility also increase with noninterest 
income volatility, the change in banks returns cannot be attributed to LLP, at least in the 
second part of our sample. Overall, these preliminary results may constitute a first set of 
evidence that banks have likely changed their business model. The next sections are 
intended to thoroughly investigate the extent to which this is the case.   
Insert Figure 8 and 9 about here 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
3.1. The banks returns model 
  The general formulation often used to describe banks performance and noninterest 
income can be expressed as:   13
01 12 tt t t t y y snonin          X    (1) 
where yt stands for an accounting measure of bank performance – e.g., the return on 
equity (ROE) or the return on assets (ROA) –, Xt is a vector of control variables, and εt is 
the innovation, or error term.  Xt controls for factors that impact banks performance (e.g. 
riskiness of loans or spread between the yield on loans and the cost of funds).  
  In its canonical form, however simple, this model presents a little complication 
since snonin is usually considered endogenous. Based on first principles and accounting 
identities, the endogeneity of snonin seems fairly non-controversial. The decision to 
diversify in OBS activities is endogenous (Campa and Kedia 2002, Baele et al. 2007, 
Laeven and Levine 2007, De Jonghe 2009). Banks returns on assets (ROA) may well be a 
function of the share of noninterest income (snonin), but snonin may itself be a function 
of ROA (Goddard et al. 2008). OBS activities could give raise to diversification benefits, 
which tends to increase ROA, and in this case the relation between ROA and snonin 
should be positive, but at the same time, a decrease in ROA might also induce banks to 
take more risk by increasing their involvement in OBS activities, and then the relation 
between ROA and snonin would be negative. ROA and snonin are thus two interactive 
banks decision variables, so that the associated endogeneity can possibly bias the estima-
tion of the sensitivity of ROA to snonin. To illustrate this issue more precisely, consider 
the two following simultaneous equations: 
11 1 1 tt t t ROA snonin z              (2) 
22 2 2 tt t t snonin ROA z         (3) 
where z1t and z2t are two exogenous variables, and  1t   and  2t  are the innovations.    14
  Equation (2) is a simplified version of the model we use in this article. If OBS 
activities lead to diversification benefits, then  1  > 0. However, we must account for the 
counter effect described by equation (3). We can suspect that  2   < 0 since banks would 
increase snonin in reaction to the decrease in ROA we usually associate with the decline 
of traditional banking (Boyd and Gertler 1994)
8. If we estimate equation (2) by OLS, we 
are thus confronted with a simultaneity or endogenous bias. Obtaining the direction of the 










               (4) 
where  1,OLS ˆ   is the estimation of  1   obtained by applying OLS to equation (2). Accord-
ing to equation (4), the sign of the bias depends on the covariance between snonin and 
1  . To compute this covariance, we can simplify equation (2) by dropping  1t z , making 
this equation exactly identified. Assume that  1t   and  2t   are uncorrelated, then the 












           (5) 
In this case the asymptotic bias (or inconsistency) in the OLS estimation of  1   has the 





. Consequently, if  2  < 0, and if  21 1    , the asymptotic bias is 
negative and the estimation of  1   is biased downward. This downward bias means that a 
                                                      
8 Actually, this could have been the main motive for banks to invest in OBS activities (Calmès and Liu 2009).   15
conventional OLS estimation could underestimate the impact of snonin on ROA, or, more 
specifically, the diversification benefits due OBS activities.  
   The motivation of this study comes from the idea that the endogeneity of snonin 
can lead to a severe underestimation of  1  in equation (2), i.e. the sensitivity of ROA to 
snonin. In the next subsections, we propose a rigorous treatment of this endogeneity issue 
and detail how to construct the higher moments instruments we use to endogeneize the 
snonin variable.  
 
3.2. Robust higher moments instruments 
  Fuller (1987) shows how the higher moments of the explanatory variables may be 
used as instruments. To explain his developments in a simple setting, consider a two 
variables model such that: , 1,2,..., tt t yx tn      ,  where 
2 ~( 0 ,) N   ,  and assume 
that  0 tt Ex   , i.e. xt, not being orthogonal to εt, can be considered endogenous. Assume 
also that there exists a variable zt t which satisfies the two following conditions,   0 tt Ez x  , 
and   0 tt Ez   . Then zt t may be used as an instrumental variable for xt. Suppose that the 
distribution of xt is not normal but asymmetric and leptokurtic. Since the distribution of xt 
is asymmetric, we have  
3 0 tx Ex  , with μx, the expected value of x. Let us set 

2
tt zx x , a potential instrumental variable, where x  stands for the mean value of x. 
Then        
3 1 10 tx tz tx Ex z n Ex  
      , and in accordance with the properties of 
the normal distribution:  0 tt Ez   . Thus, the second-order moment 
2
t x x   qualifies as 
an instrumental variable for xt. By the same token, if the distribution of xt is leptokurtic, 
the third-order moment 
3
t x x   also qualifies as an instrumental variable. According to   16
Fuller (1987), the co-moment    tt y yx x    and the second-order moment of the depend-
ent variable 
2
t yy  may also be used as instruments.  
Two key advantages of using these higher-moments instruments is that (i) they are robust 
in the sense that their correlation with the endogenous variable is high while they are 
orthogonal to the equation residuals, and (ii) they are based on the variables of the model 
itself, thus requiring no extraneous information. In the context of our model, resorting to 
higher moments instruments of this nature delivers a consistent estimator of  2  , the 
snonin coefficient of our model (equation (1)). For the treatment of snonin endogeneity, 
we thus use the following set of instruments:      
     
2323
1, ,,, tt t t t x xx xx yy yy      Z            (6) 




3.3. A modified TSLS regression incorporating an Hausman endogeneity test 
  To test for the endogeneity of snonin we do not rely on the standard Hausman 
(1978) test but rather a transformed version of this test based on an artificial (auxiliary) 
regression. The standard Hausman test, i.e. the h test, is based on the following h statis-
tic:         ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
-1 T
2
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS h - Var -Var - ~ g         , where  ˆ
OLS   is the OLS estima-
tor of the parameters vector;  ˆ
IV  , the corresponding instrumental variable (IV) estimator; 
 ˆ
OLS Var  and    ˆ
IV Var   the respective variances of the estimated parameters, and g the 
number of explanatory variables. The standard Hausman test measures the significance of   17
the distance vector  ˆˆ
IVO L S -  . If the p-value of the test is less than 5%, the hypothesis H0 
of no-endogeneity is rejected for a confidence level of 95%. However, as noted by 
McKinnon (1992), when the weighting matrix of the test     ˆˆ
IV OLS Var -Var   
   is not 
positive definite, the h test is problematic. Moreover, the standard h test does not directly 
provide coefficients adjusted for endogeneity. To address these issues, we resort to an 
alternative Hausman test. The modified version of the h test we introduce is directly 
related to the work of Hausman (1978), Spencer and Berk (1981), McKinnon (1992) and 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998)
9. To implement this version of the Hausman test, we first 
rewrite the banks returns model (equation (1)) as: 
01 12 tt t t t y y snonin          X    (7) 
Since   ,0 tt E snonin   , snonin is an endogenous variable. A consistent estimator can be 
found if we can identify an instrument data matrix    12 , ,..., k zz z  Z  – k being the number 
of instruments – to treat the snonin endogeneity. As discussed earlier, in our case, this 
instrument set is the vector of higher moments Z (equation (6)). The higher moments 
Hausman test is then implemented in two steps. First, using the instrument set Z, we 
compute the fitted value of snonint, noted  ˆ t snonin . Thus we regress snonint on the instru-
ments vector Zt to obtain  ˆ t snonin , 
0 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ
tt t t snonin t snonin snonin c w snonin w      Z     (8) 
where  ˆ
t snonin w is the innovation resulting from the regression of snonin on the instruments 
set Z. Then, we substitute  ˆ t snonin  to snonint in the banks returns model (equation (7)). 
This way we can obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of the returns equations. 
                                                      
9 For an application to hedge funds see also Racicot and Théoret (2008).    18
In a second step, provided that there is no endogeneity concern, we can substitute equa-
tion (8) in equation (7) to obtain the following artificial (or auxiliary) regression 
01 12 2 ˆˆ
t t t t t snonin t y y snonin w            X    (9) 
  Finally, using equation (9), we can build our endogeneity Hausman test with 
higher moments. Despite the evidence gathered so far, let assume for a moment that we 
do not know a priori whether snonin is endogenous or not, so that the coefficients of 
ˆ t snonin  and  ˆ
t snonin w are not necessarily the same. In this case, we have to replace the coef-
ficient β2 attached to  ˆ
t snonin w  by θ, a mute coefficient, in equation (9), and thus we have: 
01 12 ˆˆ
t t t t t snonin t y y snonin w            X    (10) 
With  ˆˆ
t t t snonin snonin snonin w  , we can reformulate equation (10) as follows: 
01 12 ˆ
t t t t t snonin t y y snonin w            X    (11) 
where  2     .  
  The endogeneity test can then be described as follows. If there is no endogeneity 
problem, then  0   , or equivalently  2   . On the other hand, if snonin happens to be 
endogenous, then   is significantly different from zero, that is to say  2    in equation 
(10).  
Compared to the standard h test, one crucial advantage of this procedure is that, 
besides providing an endogeneity test, it can also be used to gauge the severity of the 
endogeneity problem. Define   
*
22 ˆˆ ˆ f    , with f’ > 0,  2 ˆ   the coefficient estimated by 
OLS, and 
*
2 ˆ   the coefficient estimated with the two-step Hausman procedure just de-
scribed. According to equation (11), if  ˆ   is significantly positive it indicates that the 
coefficient of snonin is overstated in the OLS regression, i.e. 
*
22 ˆˆ    . As implied by the   19
definition, the severity of the endogeneity problem increases with  ˆ  . The opposite argu-
ment holds true if  ˆ   is significantly negative. Finally, if  ˆ   is not significantly different 
from zero, then 
*
22 ˆˆ     and there is no clear evidence of an endogeneity problem in this 
case.  
  As a final remark note that, as implicitly suggested by Spencer and Berk (1981) 
and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), the coefficients estimated with the auxiliary regres-
sion (11) are the same as those obtained from a standard TSLS procedure based on the 
instruments used for the  ˆ
t snonin w computation. If  ˆ   is not significantly different from zero 
(i.e. the case of no endogeneity), the OLS estimator obtains and equation (11) becomes: 
 01 12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ tt t t t OLS y y snonin          X    (12) 
However, if  ˆ   is significantly different from zero, the TSLS estimator obtains and equa-
tion (11) reads: 

** * *
01 12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
t t t t t snonin t TSLS y y snonin w            X    (13) 
where the coefficients are starred to indicate that they are equivalent to those obtained 
from a TSLS procedure. Consequently, our endogeneity indicator may also be rewritten 
as   2, 2, ˆˆ ˆ OLS TSLS f    , where  ˆ   becomes an indicator of the distance between the OLS 
and the TSLS snonin coefficients. 
  In summary, the Hausman procedure we propose can be seen as a modified TSLS 
directly incorporating an endogeneity test. This correspondence between the Hausman 
artificial regression and the TSLS is often overlooked in the econometric literature. 
Maybe researchers do not realize that, by using this kind of modified procedure they can 
directly obtain an indication of the acuity of the endogeneity problem. Obviously, for the   20
estimation of equation (1), the standard TSLS procedure and this Hausman procedure are 
interchangeable. The estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same in 
both cases. However, the motivation to favour the latter is that it provides a crucial in-
formation on endogeneity, namely, it helps assess the severity of the biases. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Insert Table 6 about here 
  In this section we discuss the empirical results of the various experiments we just 
described, beginning with those of the estimation method most commonly used in the 
literature, i.e. the OLS.  Note however that we first need to examine the stationarity of the 
time series used in our model in order to avoid spurious results. Table 6 provides the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the time series used in this study. Over the 
sample period, the test indicates that only the snonin variable seems to have a unit root, 
the p-value of the test being equal to 0.276 for this variable, so the hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root cannot be rejected at the usual thresholds. To make the snonin 
variable I(0) we thus express it in first-differences in our experiments.  
 
4.1. OLS results 
  Table 7 reports the results of the OLS estimation of equation (1) where banks 
returns are proxied by ROA, a standard approach in the literature. We call this version 
Model 1, where the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets is the only significant 
control variable, so that Model 1 reads: 
12 3 4 1 tt t t t ROA d(snonin) LLP ROA             (14)   21
where ROA is the return on assets, d(snonin) is the first-difference of snonin, LLP are 
loan losses provisions and  is the innovation
10.  
The fit of the model seems quite good over the whole sample period, the adjusted 
R
2 being 0.62. Consistent with the idea that loan loss provisions ought to lower profits, 
the coefficient of the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, at -0.50, is found signifi-
cantly negative. Since the ratio of loan loss provisions increases during recessions, it 
magnifies the procyclicality of ROA.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
  Table 7 shows that the risk-return trade-off improves throughout the sample 
period. The coefficient of d(snonin), i.e. snonin expressed in first-differences, significant 
at the 95% confidence level, is 1.28. To illustrate the evolution of the snonin-ROA rela-
tionship, it is much instructive to run a recursive regression over the whole period. Figure 
10 reveals a regime shift in the sensitivity of ROA to d(snonin) around 1997, which 
corroborates our previous findings about the presence of a structural break. According to 
the results derived from this recursive regression, the sensitivity of ROA to d(snonin) 
appears larger after 1997. We find this relationship both positive and much more signifi-
cant. In this respect Figure 10 suggests a narrowing of the confidence interval of the 
d(snonin) coefficient after 1997. The N-step forecast of ROA also confirms the presence 
of a structural break
11.   
Insert Figure 10 about here 
                                                      
10 To check the robustness of the model we also consider a second version of the specification, Model 2, where we introduce risk 
premia. 
11 A rolling regression of fifteen quarters on Model 1, which provides a more precise estimation than a recursive regression, also 
confirms that the sensitivity of ROA to snonin turns from negative to positive around 1997. This supports the emergence of  the 
diversification gains associated with market-oriented activities.   22
Because of the growth in the banks new business lines, we should expect a deteriora-
tion of the model performance in the second subperiod. Indeed, it is during this second 
subperiod that banks begin to integrate their new banking business to their traditional 
bank lending activities. Our experiments suggest that the risk prevailing in the second 
subperiod, as implied by the volatility of the banks income growth, is actually more 
pronounced, and feeds into the innovation term of the equation
12. The data track this 
change in the banking environment quite well. In the ROA equation, the adjusted R
2 is 
equal to 0.87 over the first period, and then falls to 0.38 in the second subperiod, corrobo-
rating the deterioration of the model fit (Table 7).  
More importantly, while banks non-traditional activities were developing, we also 
observe a change in the sign of the d(snonin) coefficient. Since banks optimize their 
profits, the shift from lending activities to OBS ones has to be motivated by expectations 
of higher returns, and eventually translates into a positive impact of snonin on banks 
performance. As expected, we indeed find that d(snonin) is negative (-0.17), although 
insignificant,  during the subperiod 1988-1996, but becomes significantly positive (1.71) 
after 1997.  
 
4.2. Hausman artificial regression results 
Insert Table 8 about here 
  We report the results of the Hausman estimation of the banks returns model 
(equation (11)) in Table 8. As previously mentioned, the Hausman procedure is very 
similar to a regular TSLS estimation
13. However, the Hausman regressions offer the 
                                                      
12 In figure 10, note that the volatility of the residuals of the recursive regression of equation (14) is much higher after 1997. 
13 Since the results obtained for the TSLS and the Hausman procedure are essentially the same we only report the Hausman procedure 
findings.    23
advantage of directly embedding an endogeneity test based on the significancy of  wsnonin, 
as measured by its t-statistic
14. Furthermore, this particular method also provides an 
indication of the severity of the endogeneity issue with the level of the wsnonin coefficient. 
What Table 8 first confirms is that the endogeneity seriously biases the estimated coeffi-
cient of d(snonin). Over the whole sample, the coefficient of d(snonin) is equal to 1.28 
when estimated by OLS, but to 2.50 when estimated with the Hausman procedure. As a 
matter of fact, the coefficient of d(snonin) appears to be globally underestimated when 
the endogeneity bias is ignored. The coefficient of wd(snonin)  is equal to -2.59 for the 
whole estimation period, and significant at the 99% confidence level. Being negative and 
high in absolute value, the coefficient of wd(snonin)  strongly suggests that the coefficient of 
d(snonin) is significantly understated in the OLS run. During the first subperiod, the 
coefficient of d(snonin) estimated by OLS is equal to  -0.17, but it becomes -0.90 if we 
account for the endogeneity of snonin. The coefficient of wd(snonin), although insignificant, 
is equal to 1.20,  which suggests that OLS overstates the impact of d(snonin) over the 
first subperiod, in line with the results of Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
More importantly, during the second subperiod, the coefficient of wd(snonin), at -
3.93, is much higher in absolute value than over the whole sample period, and becomes 
significant at the 95% confidence level. This result strongly suggests that the endogeneity 
is more pronounced during the second subperiod. Compared to the whole sample period, 
the underestimation of the positive effect of d(snonin) on ROA is particularly severe in 
this period. This result indicates that the sensitivity of ROA to d(snonin) has increased 
after 1997, a fact consistent with the idea of a better integration of OBS activities to 
traditional business lines – i.e., the rise of shadow banking. To confirm this finding, it is 
                                                      
14 i.e. the t test constitutes the Hausman test.    24
much instructive to run a recursive regression. In Figure 11 note that the confidence 
interval of the coefficient of wd(snonin) shrinks greatly through time. This indicates that 
snonin endogeneity issue becomes more important pari passu with the increased in-
volvement of banks in market-oriented business lines. In this respect, the spike of the 
wd(snonin) coefficient during the subprime crisis might also suggest that the endogeneity 
issue is actually more acute during turbulent times.  
Insert Figure 11 about here 
Overall, our results suggest an important understatement of the coefficients of 
d(snonin) in the OLS regressions over the whole sample period, and especially for the 
second subperiod. Taking endogeneity carefully into account reveals that, with a better 
integration of traditional and OBS activities, the negative sensitivity of ROA to d(snonin) 
detected during the first subperiod progressively decreases to actually become positive 
during the 1997-2010 subperiod. After 1997, controlling for endogeneity the way we do 
translates in substantial gains in terms of estimation, and unveils a clear, positive influ-
ence of d(snonin) on returns, the coefficient more than doubling, from 1.71 to 3.79. What 
is crucial here is not merely the fact that the positive influence of OBS on returns obtains 
when controlling for endogeneity, but the fact that, unless endogeneity is treated seri-
ously, this positive influence can be significantly underestimated. In this respect, the 
findings we obtain are quite natural if we consider that the endogeneity of snonin must 
evolve along with the involvement of banks in market-oriented banking. In other words, 
it should not be too much surprising to find that snonin endogeneity becomes more severe 
with the rise of shadow banking.   
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4.3. Results robustness 
4.3.1. Estimation with  Sharpe ratios 
It is interesting to first check if our results are robust to a change in the way we ac-
count for risk. We thus express ROA with a risk-adjusted measure based on the Sharpe 








 , where ROA is the mean value of 
ROA over the whole sample period, and  t,ROA  , the standard deviation of ROA,  is repre-
sented by a moving average computed on a rolling window of four quarters. The numera-
tor of the ratio is thus the return of ROA at time t expressed in deviation from the mean 
value, and it is scaled by a moving average of the standard deviation to arrive at a risk-
adjusted measure. We estimate Model 1 using this Sharpe ratio as the dependent variable. 
The estimated equation becomes: 
12 3 4 1 tt t t t Sharpe d(snonin) LLP Sharpe            (15) 
Insert Table 9 and 10 about here 
The results of the OLS estimation of equation (15) are provided in Table 9, and 
the corresponding Hausman regression results are reported in Table 10. These tables 
indicate that the results are almost identical with an alternative measure of returns ad-
justed for risk. The OLS regression underestimates substantially the coefficient of 
d(snonin) over the whole sample period, and particularly so after 1997, the coefficient 
being actually insignificant over the subperiod 1988-1996. Over the whole sample (1988-
2010), the coefficient of d(snonin), significant at the 1% threshold, is equal to 11.32 when 
estimated by OLS, but to 19.10, also significant at the 1% threshold,  when estimated 
with our Hausman procedure. The coefficient of wd(snonin), significant at the 10% thresh-  26
old, is also high, at -15.08, which confirms the large underestimation of the coefficient of 
d(snonin). The same results obtain over the period 1997-2010. Figure 12 displays the 
behaviour of the coefficient of d(snonin) when we run a recursive regression on the 
Sharpe ratio version of Model 1 over the period 1988-2010. The figure gives a clear 
picture of the evolution of the impact of OBS activities on banks performance. The coef-
ficient touches a low of -27.4 in the third quarter of 1993. It increases progressively 
thereafter, and turned positive in the second quarter of 1995. From 1997 onwards, it 
stabilizes around a level of 12. As for the ROA Model 1, the confidence interval of the 
d(snonin) coefficient is much narrower after 1997, which suggests that the diversification 
benefits of banks OBS activities improve substantially after the structural break.   
Insert Figure 12 about here 
 
4.3.2. Adding risk premia 
  To check the robustness of the results obtained with our primary model, we can 
also define an augmented version of the model, Model 2, adding risk premia to the ex-
planatory variables. In this case, equation (14) becomes: 
12 3 4 15 6 1 tt t T S X , t t t t ROA d(snonin) LLP r Spread ROA                     (16) 
where   tsx r  is the return on the TSX index and Spread is the difference between the yield 
on loans and their funding cost. We expect a positive sign for 4  , as an increase in the 
stock return should lead to an increase in ROA, especially in the new banking context,  
given the relative contribution of market-oriented activities to the banking business. The 
sign of  5   is less clear however. If supply-side effects dominate the loans market, the 
sign should be positive, an increase in Spread leading to a corresponding increase in   27
ROA. But demand-side effects might mitigate this relationship. An increase in Spread 
may thus induce a decrease in the demand for loans, and possibly a decrease in ROA. 
This counter-effect may also be more pronounced during the second part of our sample, 
since financial deepening accelerates and traditional activities lose steam. Moreover, the 
increase in Spread might also be symptomatic of an increase of credit risk, especially in 
the form of loans defaults, leading to a decrease in ROA.  
Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here 
  Tables 11 and 12 report, respectively, the OLS and Hausman regressions results 
for Model 2. Not surprisingly the R
2 of the regressions are generally higher following the 
addition of risk premia. For instance, over the period 1988-2010, for the OLS regressions 
the R
2 without the risk premia is equal to 0.62, but it increases to 0.71 with the added 
variable. The increase of the R
2 is higher over the first period, the influence of the spread 
being much higher during this subperiod. The results for d(snonin) are essentially the 
same after the addition of risk premia, although the impact of this variable decreases 
somewhat. For example, in Model 2, the coefficient of d(snonin) is equal to 0.90 in the 
OLS estimation run over the whole sample period, while it is equal to 1.28 in Model 1. It 
also decreases from 1.71 to 1.37 over the subperiod 1997-2010. More importantly, the 
Hausman regressions indicate that the sensitivity of ROA to d(snonin) is understated over 
the whole period, and especially so during the second subperiod (1997-2010, Table 12). 
Over the whole sample, the coefficient of wd(snonin) is equal to -2.68 and significant at the 
10% threshold. However, after 1997, the coefficient of w d(snonin),  equal to -4.05 and 
significant at the 5% threshold, suggests a much larger underestimation of the coefficient 
of d(snonin). Accordingly, when shifting from the OLS to the Hausman regressions, the   28
coefficients of d(snonin) are revised from 0.90 to 2.29 over the period 1988-2010, and 
from 1.37 to 3.47 over the subperiod 1997-2010.  
  The coefficients of the rTSX  and Spread variables are both positive and significant 
at the 5% threshold in the OLS and Hausman regressions run over the whole sample, 
although the impact of rTSX  is much lower than the spread one. As expected, the influence 
of the spread is higher in the first subperiod, its coefficient being equal to 0.43 in the OLS 
regression and significant at the 1% threshold, and actually becomes insignificant in the 
second subperiod. If, during the first subperiod, an increase in the spread leads to an 
increase in ROA (supply-side effect), it exerts an opposite impact over the second period 
(demand-side effect). To confirm this idea, Figure 13 plots the behaviour of the spread 
coefficient when applying a recursive regression to Model 2. Note that the impact of the 
spread coefficient increases from 1988 to 1996, but decreases continuously thereafter, a 
switch which also accords with the structural break identified earlier. This result suggests 
that banks traditional activities recedes from 1997 onwards, as the financial deepening 
progressively unfolds. The finding can also be explained by increased competition, as 
demand-side effects could have begun to dominate supply-side ones in the loans markets.  
Insert Figure 13 about here 
  Finally note that rTSX has no impact on ROA in the first subperiod, whereas its 
impact becomes positive and significant over the second subperiod. This corroborates the 
view of a sharp regime shift in the banking industry. Before 1997 the fact that banks 
activities were more focused on traditional business lines explains the greater impact of   29
the spread and the insignificant impact of stock returns. The situation clearly reverses 
thereafter
15.   
  
4.3.3. A look at disaggregate data 
Insert Tables 13 and 14 about here 
 Since  idiosyncratic  risk is diluted by diversification, it should have a lower influ-
ence at the aggregate level. Despite the data limitation, it is thus legitimate to wonder 
whether the results also hold at the disaggregate level. To check this, we consider the 
three banks selected for building Figure 3. In terms of assets, these three banks account 
for more than 50% of the Canadian banking system. The results for Model 1 are reported 
in Tables 13 and 14, for the OLS and Hausman regressions respectively. The analysis of 
the coefficients of wsnonin,it shows that, not taking into account snonin endogeneity may 
also seriously bias the estimated coefficients at the disaggregate level. Although the 
results obviously differ from one bank to another, the OLS generally underestimate the 
impact of d(snonin). The  wsnonin,it coefficients are high in absolute value and very signifi-
cant for the Toronto-Dominion bank over the whole period and over the two subperiods, 
1988-1996 and 1997-2010. These coefficients are respectively -9.11, -8.90 and -8.72 over 
these periods, which suggests a serious understatement of the d(snonin) coefficients over 
the three periods. Without accounting for endogeneity, the Toronto-Dominion  d(snonin) 
coefficients are respectively -2.82, 4.63 and 4.13 over the periods 1988-1996, 1997-2010, 
and 1988-2010, and significant and the 5% threshold (Table 13), but when we account for 
endogeneity, the coefficients increase respectively to 5.12, 9.14 and 9.11 over the same 
                                                      
15 As with Model 1, we also run Model 2 (equation (16)) with a Sharpe ratio. However the results remain fairly unchanged (cf. the 
appendix, Tables 17 and 18).  
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periods, again significant at the 5% threshold. Moreover, in the Hausman regressions, the 
sign of d(snonin) is already positive and significant over the first subperiod, which is not 
the case for the two other banks. The National Bank results remain aligned with those of 
the Toronto-Dominion, but they differ greatly for the Royal Bank. First, this bank dis-
plays less persistence in its ROA, as measured by the coefficient of ROAt-1 (Table 14). 
Second, as it is the case at the aggregate level, the financial performance of this bank has 
initially suffered from its increasing involvement in OBS activities, but in its particular 
case, there does not seem to be tangible benefits over the second subperiod either. Indeed, 
in the Hausman regression, the estimated coefficient of d(snonin) is equal to -0.64 and 
insignificant over the subperiod 1997-2010 (Table 14). Third, over the last subperiod, 
there is a positive comovement between the Royal Bank LLP and its ROA, which is not 
the case for the two other banks for which LLP coefficients are negative and significant. 
Indeed, for the Royal Bank, the coefficient of LLP is equal to 0.82 and significant at the 
99% confidence level. This provides an example of some banks managing their provi-
sions during the second subperiod, perhaps, progressively increasing their LLP to better 
reflect their rising exposure to OBS activities and less favourable risk-return trade-off 
(i.e. earnings management by income smoothing, Bikker 2005, Quagliariello 2008, 
Eickmeier and Hofmann, 2009, Nijskens and Wagner 2011).  
Insert Tables 15 and 16 about here 
Table 15 and 16 provides the estimation of Model 2 (i.e., Model 1, risk premia 
augmented) for the three banks with the OLS and Hausman regressions respectively. The 
model works quite well for the National Bank and the Toronto Dominion bank over the 
three periods, but its performance is rather poor for the Royal Bank over the whole sub-  31
period, with a R
2 equal to 0.07. As shown in Table 16, the addition of risk premia in the 
ROA equation does not change the results regarding the behaviour of the d(snonin) coef-
ficient, and in particular its undestatement over the whole sample period and the second 
subperiod. Consistent with what happens at the aggregate level, stocks returns have a 
negligible impact over the first subperiod for the National Bank and the Royal Bank, and 
a significant positive impact over the second period, although this impact is close to 0 and 
insignificant for the Toronto-Dominion Bank. Concerning the spread variable, the results 
also supports the findings obtained at the aggregate level, namely the declining influence 
of the spread through the sample period. However, the coefficient of the spread remains 
positive and significant for the National Bank during the second subperiod, which reflects 
its greater involvement in retail activities.    
To summarize, although the results derived from a casual look at the disaggregate 
data have to be considered with caution, given the restricted sample size, the  evidence 
we gather seems to confirm the progressive improvement of banks accounting returns 
associated with their expansion in market-oriented activities.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The change in the endogeneity of banks decision to invest in OBS activities may 
well be related to the fact that, due to the decreasing return on their traditional activities, 
banks had to resort to market-oriented activities as a way to increase their profitability 
(Boyd and Gertler 1994). Initially, a structural downward pressure on ROA could have 
led to a rise in snonin whose endogeneity thus mechanically increased through time. At 
first, when banks engaged in non-traditional activities, they were not necessarily aware   32
of the increased risk they were taking however
16. Our data reveal that, after 1987, with 
the successive waves of banking deregulation, and the financial deepening associated 
with the increased firms reliance on direct financing, it took almost ten years for banks 
to eventually record some diversification gains from OBS activities. After this matura-
tion phase however, the change in the banking system, namely the emergence of shadow 
banking is clearly characterized by the growing share of market-oriented business lines 
in OBS activities, and a concomitant increase in operating revenue volatility, but also by 
the eventual pricing of the risk associated with the new business lines which gradually 
made the bulk of the banking business (Calmès and Théoret 2010, Nijskens and Wagner 
2011). 
Accordingly, in this paper we argue that the interdependence of snonin and ROA, 
and the resulting endogeneity of snonin have increased with the progressive diversifica-
tion of banks in market-oriented business lines. Consistent with this view, the new 
Hausman procedure we introduce reveals that the endogeneity due to the dependence of 
snonin on ROA becomes much more significant during the last subperiod. The endogen-
ity of OBS activities may not be much of a concern before 1997, but it increases sub-
stantially during the last decade. In this respect, neglecting endogeneity leads to a seri-
ous underestimation of the impact of noninterest income on ROA.  Actually, the increase 
in ROA might be attributed to a risk premium required to price the increased risk associ-
ated with banks new activities, as evidenced by the jump in the volatility of banks net 
operating income growth after 1997.  
The policy implications we can derive from our analysis are quite straightfor-
ward. First, given their high endogeneity degree, there is a need to better monitor OBS 
                                                      
16 Comments can be found in the work of DeYoung and Roland (2001) about U.S. bankers initial thoughts on OBS activities.    33
activities. Banks should have the obligation to be more transparent about the involve-
ment in these activities. Second, and more importantly, although the focus of the Bank 
of International Settlements (Basle II), the International Monetary Fund, and central 
banks in general has been mainly on credit risk analysis – i.e. the supervision of on-
balance-sheet items and risk management – there is an obvious need to include more 
comprehensive measures of bank systemic risk, encompassing both the traditional 
measures of VaR and various regulatory measures of leverage, but also measures ac-
counting for the risk inherent to OBS activities. In this respect, it is not clear whether the 
use of the standard measures of leverage, as those endorsed by Basle III, could account 
for the new cyclical aspects of banks systemic risk. In this sense, the research agenda 
could for example aim at building more general leverage measures and indicators of 
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Appendix 
 




OLS estimation   
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  -7.60 0.36 -1.31 
   -1.60 0.11 -0.81 
d(snonin)  -1.20 7.19 7.12 
   -0.07 2.10 2.02 
LLP  -2.29 -5.87 -2.33 
   -4.71 -3.31 -4.15 
rTSX(-1)  0.04 0.04 0.05 
   1.07 1.76 2.39 
Spread  2.32 0.48 0.72 
   1.87 0.47 1.55 
Sharpet-1  0.55 0.35 0.47 
   6.00 3.60 5.49 
Adjusted R
2  0.66 0.33 0.38 
DW stat.  1.88 1.99 2.09 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the excess return of ROA, defined as the 
difference between ROA and its expected value, scaled by a rolling ROA 
standard deviation of four quarters. ROA, return on assets ; d(snonin), first-
difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, 
ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets; rTSX, stock return index; 
Spread, difference between the yield on loans and the cost of funds. The t 
statistics  are reported in italics.  
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Table 18 
Hausman regression   
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  -7.44 0.84 -1.20 
   -1.72 0.23 -0.74 
d(snonin)  25.23 15.14 15.15 
   1.11 2.82 3.50 
LLP  -2.27 -5.86 -2.31 
   -5.64 -3.16 -4.42 
rTSX(-1)  0.04 0.05 0.06 
   0.89 1.85 2.47 
Spread  2.26 0.32 0.67 
   2.03 0.29 1.47 
Sharpet-1  0.59 0.35 0.48 
   6.73 3.33 5.27 
wd(snonin)  -26.90 -16.41 -16.01 
   -1.52 -1.63 -2.10 
Adjusted R
2  0.68 0.33 0.39 
DW stat.  1.84 2.01 2.11 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the excess return of ROA, defined as the 
difference between ROA and its expected value, scaled by a rolling ROA 
standard deviation of four quarters. ROA, return on assets ; d(snonin), first-
difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, 
ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets; rTSX, stock return index; 
Spread, difference between the yield on loans and the cost of funds. The w 
variable is the residuals obtained with a regression of d(snonin) on instru-
ments, which constitutes the Hausman test. The t statistics  are reported in 
italics.  
 






Table 1  
Decomposition of the variance of net operating income growth  
 
 
   1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
  Average  Variance  Contribution to  Average  Variance  Contribution to   Average Variance Contribution  to 
   share     variance  share     variance  share     variance 
Net operating revenue     11.0        66.3       33.3   
Net interest income  0.67 13.6  6.1  0.49 17  4.1  0.57 15.2  4.9 
Noninterest income  0.33 27.7  3.0  0.51 243.7  63.4  0.43 153.4  28.4 
Covariance     4.3  1.9     -2.2  -1.1   0.05  0.0 
Correlation      0.22        -0.03        0.01    
 
Note:  The variance decomposition is obtained by using the simple portfolio variance formula, which is 
T Variance  w Ωw , where w is the 
vector of the respective shares of net interest income and noninterest income in banks net operating revenue, and Ω  is the variance-covariance 
matrix of net interest income growth and noninterest income growth. 









   non-interest capital  income    retail insurance  trading  securitization other 
   income markets  wealth  mgt             
 Level (end-of-period, million $)  9244859 2513622  2039389  1522159  2017460.6  130621  723671  297936 
 Mean (million $)  7952304 2692371  1345518  1039965  1070721  939987  403025  556378 
 Median (million $)  7789256 2647529  1297605  1021984  889839  1293237  334615  554668 
 Std. Dev. (million $)  1679514 556968 430527 275342  545111  1191256 220719 204013 
 Share (start-of-period)   0.37  0.14  0.13  0.05  0.14  0.01  0.16 
 Share (end-of-period)   0.27  0.22  0.16  0.22  0.01  0.08  0.03 
 Average share   0.35  0.17  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.05  0.08 
 Skewness  -0.09 0.76 0.10  0.15  0.80  -1.84 2.18 -0.72 
 Kurtosis  2.51 4.52  1.75  2.08  2.91  6.24 9.11 3.15 
 
Notes: Capital markets comprises the global wholesale banking business providing corporate , public sector and institutional clients with a wide range of 
products and services. Income wealth management designates a full range of investment, trust and other wealth management, and asset management products 
and services provided to high net worth clients.  Retail income includes personal and business retail banking operations like mutual funds, services fees and 
credit cards management. Insurance comprises life and health, home, auto and travel insurance products. Trading comprises trading and distribution operations 
largely related to fixed income, foreign exchange, equities and derivative products. Securitization refers to the securitization process of credit card receivables 
and residential mortgages primarily used to diversify banks funding sources and enhance liquidity positions.  
Source of data: Bank of Canada.  
 
 









   Average share  Variance  Contribution  Covariance  Contribution  Total  
         to variance     to covariance  contribution 
Noninterest income      3016.3           3016.3 
               
Components            
              
capital market income  0.35 342.7  42.0  147.9  51.8 93.7 
income wealth-mgt income  0.17 44.3  1.3  24.5  4.2 5.4 
retail income  0.13 98.9  1.7  65.2  8.5 10.1 
insurance income  0.11 399.4  4.8  -59.6  -6.6 -1.7 
trading income  0.11 238112.0  2881.2  443.2  48.7 2929.9 
securitization income  0.05 522.9  1.3  -494.4  -24.7 -23.4 
other income  0.08 18.9  0.1  26.3  2.1 2.2 
Total        2932.3     84.0  3016.3 
 
Notes: The variance decomposition is obtained by using the simple portfolio variance formula, which is 
T Variance  w Ωw , where w is 
the vector of the respective shares of the components of noninterest income, and  Ω  is the variance-covariance matrix of the components 






w , where the relative contribution of component i is equal to  2 i Ω w with  i Ω  the i




Johansen’s cointegration test for snonin versus TSX 
 
 
   periods test  p-value  number of  Normalized cointegrating 
         cointegrating equations  coefficients 
 TSX (level)  1988-1996 0.6067  0  snonin TSX 
   1988-2010  0.0601  1  1.000  -3.00E-05*** 
   1997-2010  0.0096  1  1.000  -6.49E-06*** 
               
 TSX (log)  1988-1996   0.8662  0      
   1988-2010  0.0965  1  1.000  -0.197*** 
   1997-2010  0.0377  1  1.000  -0.054*** 
 
Notes: A p-value equal to 0.05 indicates the presence of a cointegrating relationship between snonin and TSX at the 95% confidence 
level and a p-value equal to 0.10 signals the presence of a conintegrating relationship at the 90% confidence level. The table reports 
the cointegrating vector when a cointegrating relationship is detected. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 
 Spearman rank-order correlations of ROA and snonin 
 









Notes: NBC: National Bank of Canada; RBC: Royal Bank of Canada Financial Group; TD: 
Toronto Dominion Bank Financial Group.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 





Augmented Dickey Fuller test for the model explanatory variables 
 
 
   test p-value 
   ROA snonin LLP Spread   TSX rTSX 
 level  0.000 0.276 0.002 0.024 0.333  0.000 
 first-differences     0.000        0.000    
 
Note : A p-value of 0.05 leads to the rejection of the H0 hypothesis (presence of a unit root) at the 95% confidence level. In the table, the 






Model 1: OLS estimation of ROA 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  0.93 0.53 0.77 
   23.90 3.87 15.06 
d(snonin)  -0.17 1.71 1.28 
   -0.14 4.34 2.57 
LLP  -0.57 -0.46 -0.50 
   -20.81 -2.85 -11.67 
ROAt-1  0.02 0.37 0.10 
   0.27 2.51 0.13 
Adjusted R
2  0.87 0.38 0.62 
DW stat.  0.64 2.08 1.36 
 
Notes:  ROA, return on assets ; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of non-
interest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions 
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Table 8  



















Notes:  ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of non-
interest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions 
over total assets. The w variable is the residuals obtained with a regression of 





Model 1: OLS estimation of the ROA Sharpe ratio 
 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  1.30 2.00 1.03 
   4.33 2.94 3.57 
d(snonin)  8.63 10.06  11.32 
   0.59 2.73 3.32 
LLP  -1.87 -6.14 -1.87 
   -4.92 -3.17 -4.19 
Sharpet-1  0.56 0.35 0.49 
   6.49 3.35 4.94 
Adjusted R
2  0.58 0.33 0.35 
DW stat.  2.05 2.02 2.09 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the excess return of ROA, defined as the 
difference between ROA and its expected value, scaled by a rolling ROA 
standard deviation of four quarters. The explanatory variables are:   
d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating 
revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets, and the Sharpe 
ratio lagged one period. The t statistics are reported in italics.  
 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  0.93 0.44 0.86 
   26.97 4.57 27.91 
d(snonin)  -0.90 3.79 2.50 
   -0.39 3.48 4.96 
LLP  -0.58 -0.43 -0.61 
   -23.15 -3.41 -16.05 
ROAt-1  0.01 0.50 0.51 
   0.13 5.26 5.32 
wd(snonin)  1.20 -3.93 -2.59 
   0.48 -2.11 -3.61 
Adjusted R
2  0.89 0.52 0.75 
DW stat.  0.80 2.41 2.10   42
 
Table 10 
Model 1: Hausman regression of the ROA Sharpe ratio 
 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  1.19 2.01 1.01 
   4.24 2.80 3.48 
d(snonin)  39.25 17.67 19.10 
   1.52 3.20 3.53 
LLP  -1.88 -6.30 -1.88 
   -5.50 -3.18 -4.23 
Sharpet-1  0.60 0.37 0.51 
   5.12 3.17 4.83 
wd(snonin)  -32.83 -15.40 -15.08 
   -1.57 -1.64 -1.68 
Adjusted R
2  0.61 0.33 0.35 
DW stat.  1.96 2.05 2.12 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the excess return of ROA, defined as the 
difference between ROA and its expected value, scaled by a rolling ROA 
standard deviation of four quarters. The explanatory variables are:   
d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating 
revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets, and the Sharpe 
ratio lagged one period. The w variable is the residuals obtained with a re-
gression of d(snonin) on the robust instruments. The t statistics  are reported 
in italics.  
   43
Table 11 
Model 2: OLS estimation of ROA 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  -0.75 0.40 0.23 
   -7.25 1.66 1.49 
d(snonin)  0.80 1.37 0.90 
   1.10 3.44 2.35 
LLP  -0.63 -0.42 -0.61 
   -42.32 -3.20 -23.97 
rTSX(-1)  0.00 0.01 0.01 
   0.30 2.53 2.71 
Spread  0.43 0.04 0.16 
   16.89 0.79  3.85 
ROAt-1  0.02 0.35 0.12 
   0.59 2.61 1.46 
Adjusted R
2  0.97 0.41 0.71 
DW stat.  1.07 2.07 1.44 
 
Notes: ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of non-
interest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions 
over total assets; rTSX,  stock return index; Spread, difference between the 
yield on loans and the cost of funds. The t statistics  are reported in italics.  
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Table 12 
Model 2: Hausman regression of ROA 
 
Variables 1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 
c  -0.70 0.38 0.25 
   -6.58 1.45 1.54 
d(snonin)  0.40 3.47 2.29 
   0.44 3.32 2.44 
LLP  -0.63 -0.37 -0.61 
   -32.81 -3.44 -21.10 
rTSX(-1)  0.00 0.01 0.01 
   -0.25 3.37 3.49 
Spread  0.43 0.02 0.14 
   16.02 0.23  3.21 
ROAt-1  0.01 0.47 0.15 
   0.46 5.13 1.42 
wd(snonin)  1.16 -4.05 -2.68 
   1.07 -2.24 -1.75 
Adjusted R
2  0.98 0.57 0.74 
DW stat.  1.24 2.45 1.41 
 
Notes: ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of non-
interest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions 
over total assets; r TSX, stock return index; Spread, difference between the 
yield on loans and the cost of funds. The w variable is the residuals obtained 
with regression of d(snonin) on the robust instruments. The t statistics  are 
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Table 13 
Model 1: OLS estimation of ROA: Three Canadian individual banks  
 
 
   National Bank of Canada  Toronto-Dominion Bank  Royal Bank of Canada 
Variables 1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010 
c  0.98  0.47  0.80  0.35  0.51  0.48  0.96 0.57 0.80 
   17.09 4.47 13.38 2.98 7.25 7.55 14.77  10.81  9.46 
d(snonin)  -1.45  1.40  1.12  -2.82  4.63  4.13  -2.55 -0.74 -0.59 
   -1.09  4.70  3.84  -2.50  3.13  2.93  -1.88 -1.33 -0.61 
LLP  -0.71  -0.23  -0.58  -0.26 -0.51 -0.35 -0.46 0.82 -0.22 
   -14.66 -1.57 -12.43 -2.32 -5.03 -3.43 -3.80 3.84 -3.45 
ROAt-1  0.08  0.38  0.07  0.71  0.43  0.48  -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 
   1.36  2.72  1.13  6.65  7.58  8.55  -0.25 -0.36 -0.61 
Adjusted R
2  0.86  0.29  0.65  0.67  0.51  0.46  0.73 0.51 0.09 
DW stat.   1.49  2.22  1.49  2.50  1.96  2.05  1.63 1.25 2.06 
 
Notes:  ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over 









   National Bank of Canada  Toronto-Dominion Bank  Royal Bank of Canada 
Variables 1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010 
c  0.95  0.39  0.77  0.40  0.38  0.36  0.96 0.57 0.79 
   15.62 4.10  8.48  5.03 4.66 6.07 14.37  10.62  9.23 
d(snonin)  0.75  2.24  1.83  5.12  9.14  9.11  -3.17 -0.64 -1.79 
   0.38  6.54  3.72  3.57  10.44  7.86  -2.39 -0.57 -0.75 
LLP  -0.70  -0.23  -0.59  -0.26 -0.44 -0.29 -0.46 0.82 -0.22 
   -14.30 -1.83  -6.79  -3.45 -3.50 -3.06 -3.73 3.82 -3.39 
ROAt-1  0.07  0.50  0.10  0.63  0.57  0.60  -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
   1.14  3.95  1.11  8.50  7.02  10.16  -0.22 -0.36 -0.46 
w d(snonin)  -1.13  -2.18  -1.83  -8.90 -8.72 -9.11  0.78 -0.14 1.79 
   -0.85  -3.83  -3.04  -6.40 -7.08 -6.27  0.64 -0.09 0.61 
Adjusted R
2  0.87  0.44  0.71  0.85  0.75  0.73  0.72 0.50 0.08 
DW stat.   1.43  2.12  1.48  2.16  1.98  1.99  1.66 1.25 2.04 
 
Notes:  ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over 
total assets. The w variable is the residuals obtained with a regression of d(snonin) on the robust instruments. The t statistics are reported in italics.   46
Table 15 




Notes:  ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions 
over total assets; rTSX, stock return index; Spread, difference between the yield on loans and the cost of funding them. The t statistics are reported in 
italics. 
 
   National Bank of Canada  Toronto-Dominion Bank  Royal Bank of Canada 
Variables  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996 1997-2010 1988-2010 1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010 
c  -1.21 -0.34 -0.19  -0.87  1.37  0.11  -0.19 1.29  0.88 
   -2.63 -1.07 -0.95  -3.17  3.84  0.49  -0.54 2.76  2.86 
d(snonin)  -1.52 1.29  1.15  -1.85  4.76  4.21  -3.17 -0.38 -0.57 
   -1.00 2.64  2.47  -1.20  3.06  2.78  -1.84 -0.54 -0.41 
LLP  -0.76  -0.33  -0.71  -0.39 -0.54 -0.46 -0.49  0.84  -0.21 
   -9.16  -2.05  -7.12  -3.97 -7.06 -4.29 -3.91  4.68  -3.01 
rTSX(-1)  -0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 
   -1.54 2.22  1.75  0.31  -0.86  -0.74  1.07 2.68  0.44 
Spread  0.57  0.30  0.29  0.35 -0.25 0.11  0.29  -0.23  -0.02 
   4.85  2.95  4.00  4.07 -2.37 1.77  2.88  -1.55  -0.29 
ROAt-1  0.08  0.21  0.10  0.57 0.37 0.48 -0.02  -0.05  -0.06 
   1.45  1.96  2.15  5.43 4.41 9.89 -0.49  -0.83  -0.63 
Adjusted R
2  0.91  0.43  0.75  0.72 0.51 0.47 0.75  0.57  0.07 
DW stat.   2.08  1.98  1.79  2.63 1.92 2.02 1.99  1.44  2.06   47
Table 16 
Model 2: Hausman regression of ROA: Three Canadian individual banks  
 
 
   National Bank of Canada  Toronto-Dominion Bank  Royal Bank of Canada 
Variables 1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010  1988-1996  1997-2010  1988-2010 
c  -1.24 -0.32 -0.13 -0.02 0.93  0.05 -0.19  1.29 0.88 
   -3.61 -1.37 -0.71 -0.06 2.29  0.43 -0.53  2.74 2.74 
d(snonin)  0.93  2.12  1.90  4.74  9.03  9.06  -3.79 -0.49 -1.66 
   0.54  3.43  3.91  2.25  6.39  7.46  -2.96 -0.61 -0.68 
LLP  -0.75  -0.32  -0.71  -0.30 -0.44 -0.36 -0.49 0.84 -0.21 
   -8.81  -2.15  -8.16  -3.20 -3.49 -3.26 -3.82 4.57 -2.98 
rTSX(-1)  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
   -1.05  4.44  2.80  0.40 -0.03 0.17  0.84 2.60 0.38 
Spread  0.56 0.27 0.27 0.12  -0.16  0.10 0.29  -0.23  -0.02 
   5.96 2.89 4.78 1.18  -1.40  2.34 2.92  -1.55  -0.28 
ROAt-1  0.07  0.34  0.12  0.60  0.52  0.60  -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 
   1.56  2.14  1.98  5.89  5.67  9.79  -0.44 -0.71 -0.50 
w d(snonin)  -1.84 -2.14 -1.97 -8.07 -8.57 -9.13 0.73 0.17 1.63 
   -1.18 -3.17 -3.22 -3.47 -4.99 -6.16 0.44 0.15 0.55 
Adjusted R
2  0.91  0.59  0.79  0.85  0.74  0.74  0.73 0.57 0.07 
DW stat.   1.97  1.86  1.67  2.27  1.95  2.00  1.97 1.44 2.04 
 
Notes:  ROA, return on assets; d(snonin), first-difference of the share of noninterest income in net operating revenue; LLP, ratio of loan loss provisions over total 
assets; rTSX, stock return index; Spread, difference between the yield on loans and the cost of funds. The w variable is the residuals obtained with a regression of 










































































































Source: Canadian Bankers Association.   49
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Note: Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked eco-
nomic slowdown. 
Source: Canadian Bankers Association. 
 
 
Figure 3 Share of noninterest income in net operating revenue (snonin), three 
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National Bank of Canada
Royal Bank
Toronto-Dominion
Eight domestic banks  
Note:  Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked economic 
slowdown.   
Source: Canadian Bankers Association. 
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variance moving average: net operating income growth
variance moving average: net interest income growth
variance moving average: noninterest income growth  
 
Note: The variance is a rolling variance computed on four quarters.  




Figure 5 Variance of noninterest income growth and of its two most volatile com-
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variance moving average: noninterest income growth
variance moving average: trading income growth
variance moving average: capital markets income growth  
Note: The variance is a rolling variance computed on four quarters. 
                                         Source: Bank of Canada.   51
 
























Note:  Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked economic slowdown in Canada. 
                                    Source : Cansim, Statistics Canada and Canadian Bankers Association.  
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Figure 8 Return on assets (ROA) and share of noninterest income (snonin)  
 










































































































































































Note:  Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked 
economic slowdown in Canada. 
Source: Canadian Bankers Association.   53
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Recursive estimate of the d(snonin) coefficient
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Recursive estimate of the spread coefficient
± 2 standard errors  